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Efficiency in the provision of medical services depends heavily upon the
availability to consumers and their various agents of information concerning
the safety, efficacy, and cost-effectiveness of particular methods of diagnosis
and treatment. Unfortunately, information of this kind tends to be a public
good that can be widely shared by free riders who pay nothing toward the cost
of its production.' To the extent, then, that society relies upon private
producers and market incentives to yield information concerning medical
treatments and other health care technology, it will be disappointed in the
amount and quality of the information produced. Society will be doubly
disappointed, however, if courts administering the nation's antitrust laws fail
to appreciate that efforts by industry groups to gather, generate, or
disseminate such information are a highly "procompetitive" form of
competitor collaboration and therefore deserve some protection against legal
attacks by other competitors whom the information happens to hurt. This
article seeks to clarify the antitrust status of organizations of professional
competitors that engage in the evaluation of medical technologies.
The danger that antitrust litigation might chill technology assessment in
medicine and thus sacrifice efficiency is not merely a theoretical risk. Two
antitrust suits have challenged one instance of professional involvement in the
evaluation of a new medical technology, 2 occasioning concern in scientific and
professional circles. 3 These cases arose out of efforts by members of the
American Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc. ("AAO"), to impede what they
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purported to believe was too-ready acceptance in medical practice of radial
keratotomy, a revolutionary but unproven surgical technique for correcting
nearsightedness. 4 The plaintiffs, including both practicing eye surgeons and
patients, alleged that certain academic ophthalmologists had conspired to
"monopolize" the procedure by inducing influential professional
organizations to issue advisory statements to the effect that the new surgical
procedure, not having passed the threshold of scientific acceptability, was still
"experimental." Allegedly, this action caused health insurers and other
payers to refuse to cover the procedure5 and induced hospitals to limit its
use. 6 At the same time, the defendants had organized, and obtained federal
funding for, a rigorous clinical trial of the procedure at nine academic medical
centers. The plaintiffs alleged that this study, together with other activities of
the defendants, made it difficult for anyone to undertake or undergo the
procedure under any other auspices.
The plaintiffs in the second of the radial keratotomy cases, 7 Schachar v.
AAO, survived a motion for summary judgment in 1988 because, in the district
court's view, "the statements and conduct of defendants . . . have a coercive
economic influence in the field of ophthalmology."-8 If such cases were
indeed to turn on the somewhat oxymoronic notion of "coercive
influence," a prestigious professional organization would risk liability for
treble damages whenever it expressed a persuasive opinion unfavorable to
those seeking to market a particular technology. Moreover, if such an
organization sponsored a clinical trial in an effort to elicit new scientific
information, it would run the additional risk that the methods by which it
encouraged practitioners to participate in the trial or the restrictions that it
imposed on them to ensure the trial's scientific validity might be characterized
as "restraints of trade," 9 triggering liability. If such legal risks should inhibit
professional bodies from expressing their collective views on technology
issues or participating in the development of new knowledge, the public
would be forced to purchase medical services in unnecessary ignorance.
4. A comparable procedure for correcting farsightedness, also developed by a Soviet eye
surgeon, is presenting comparable questions today. Van, U.S. Surgeons Cautious on Moscow
Farsightedness Operation, Durham Morning Herald, Mar. 26, 1989, at D 11, col. 1.
5. Authoritative statements concerning the state of scientific knowledge can influence the
construction of statutes and insurance policies governing the obligations of public and private payers
for medical care, who are generally not required to pay for a treatment that is not yet medically
recognized. Many payers, apparently taking their cue from the opinions of radial keratotomy so
authoritatively expressed and from the use of the magical word "experimental," refused to pay for
the procedure until it had been somehow validated by the medical/academic complex.
6. Hospitals were apparently influenced not only by the difficulty of obtaining payment but also
by doubts about the legal risks and ethics of allowing experimental surgery on their premises.
7. The first case was settled inconclusively following a 1983 ruling on certain immunity and
jurisdictional issues. Vest v. Waring, 565 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Ga. 1983). See Suit Against PERK
Ophthalmologists Is Settled, OCULAR SURGERY NEWS, Aug. 1, 1985, at I (reporting settlement and setting
forth one defendant's new, favorable opinion of radial keretotomy, the issuance of which was
required by terms of settlement).
8. 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67, 986, at 58,053 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
9. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits -[e]very contract, combination .... or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1983).
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Because information of this kind is in short supply in any event, undue legal
constraints on its collective production and dissemination could be quite
costly to society in its attempt to avoid unwise spending on health services.
Fortunately, the Schachar case was finally resolved in a way that should allay
some of the fears to which it gave rise. Not only did the trial of the case result
in a jury verdict for the defendants, but the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, in ruling on the plaintiffs' appeal, held that the case should never have
been submitted to the jury in the first place.' 0 The court stated that "when a
trade association provides information . . . but does not constrain others to
follow its recommendations, it does not violate the antitrust laws."" The
court also expressed impatience toward the plaintiffs' theory that an
expression of a collective opinion can, without more, restrain trade:
Antitrust law does not compel your competitor to praise your product .... Unless
one group of suppliers diminishes another's ability to peddle its wares (technically,
reduces rivals' elasticity of supply), there is not even the beginning of an antitrust case,
no reason to investigate further to determine whether the restraint is "reasonable."12
Judge Easterbrook, writing for the court, began his opinion by stating that the
case was decided by the "truism" that "there can be no restraint of trade
without a restraint."' 3
Although Judge Easterbrook's incisiveness is refreshing, his opinion in
Schachar leaves some possible questions unaddressed. Moreover, his
reputation as an exponent of the "Chicago School" of antitrust theorizing 4
may cause some observers to discount his hard-line rhetoric-for example,
"we do not perceive what this has to do with antitrust"I 5-and to cling to
traditional theories of antitrust law that might provide relief in another case or
in another circuit.' 6 At the risk of dignifying some such legal theories more
than they deserve, this article seeks to provide a somewhat broader
foundation for the Schachar court's ruling and to explore some issues that the
case did not directly raise. It begins by providing some background on the
economics and policy implications of medical technology assessment.
II
THE MARKET FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGIES
Medical science has always been dedicated to discovering safe and
efficacious ways of treating disease, and the medical profession has always
10. 870 F.2d. at 398.
11. Id. at 399.
12. Id. Presumably the court meant directly "diminishes another's ability . See infra notes 86,
87 and accompanying text.
13. Id. at 397.
14. Judge Easterbrook, a former law professor at the University of Chicago, has been a leader in
the rethinking of antitrust policy that has occurred in the past decade. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Workable
Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696 (1986); Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1
(1984). On the larger movement, see infra notes 120-21.
15. 870 F.2d at 400.
16. See infra note 121.
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portrayed itself as the exclusive vehicle for translating scientific learning into
benefits for patients. Major questions have been raised in recent years,
however, about the quality and completeness of scientific inquiry by medical
researchers, about the scientific evidence supporting many of physicians'
customary practices, and about the process by which technologies enter into,
or are retained in, the mainstream of medical care. It has been pointed out,
for example, that many diagnostic and treatment procedures in widespread
use are not known with adequate certainty to benefit patients, either at all or
under many of the circumstances in which they are employed.' 7 Even when
there is a basis for believing in the efficacy of a particular technology, it may
not be known whether alternative methods are better at achieving the desired
result in at least some circumstances or whether they are capable of doing so
at a lower cost or with less risk of significant side effects. There are, indeed,
several rather startling findings concerning the weakness of the scientific
evidence supporting some widely accepted medical treatments.' 8 The
absence of clear scientific guidance has contributed to wide variations in
physicians' clinical practices.' 9
Critics of medical science and medical practice have had excellent success
in stimulating interest in technology assessment in the 1980's. Indeed, both
public and private decision makers have become quite enamored of the
concept. 20 In general, medical technology assessment might be thought of as
17. E.g., B. JENNETr, HIGH TECHNOLOGY MEDICINE: BENEFITS AND BURDENS 221-26 (1986); A.
COCHRANE, EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY: RANDOM REFLECTIONS ON HEALTH SERVICES 27-44
(1971); Eddy & Billings, The Quality of Medical Evidence. Implications for Quality of Care, HEALTH AFFS.,
Spring 1988, at 19, 20 ("for at least some important practices, the existing evidence is of such poor
quality that it is virtually impossible to determine even what effect the practice has on patients, much
less whether that effect is preferable to the outcomes that would have occurred with other options");
Eddy, Clinical Policies and the Quality of Clinical Practice, 307 NEW ENG. J. MED. 343 (1982) ("there is
reason to believe that there are flaws in the process by which the profession generates clinical
policies").
The Schachar court observed the need for technology assessment as follows:
Even the most promising medical developments often turn out to have drawbacks, whose
nature and magnitude should be determined. Many who have undergone radial keratotomy
report improvement in their eyesight (sometimes so much change that they become
farsighted). What are the long-run consequences? Most persons' visual acuity slowly
changes with time. Does the eyesight of those who have had this operation change in
different ways? Might the invasive procedure weaken the eye in a way that creates problems
of a different kind? A surgical procedure used in Japan in the 1950s caused "corneal
decompensation" about ten years later, a serious condition leading to blindness (avoidable
with corneal transplants). Radial keratotomy is different, but once burned twice shy.
870 F.2d at 398.
18. See, e.g., A. COCHRANE, supra note 17, at 45-66; Eddy & Billings, supra note 17; Eddy, Sanders
& Eddy, The Value of Screening for Glaucoma with Tonometry, 28 SURVEY OF OPHTHALMOLOGY 194 (1983).
See generally B. JENNETr, supra note 17, at 53-140.
19. E.g., Chassin, Brook, Park, Keesey, Fink, Kosecoff, Kahn, Merrick & Solomon, Variations in
the Use of Medical and Surgical Services by the Medicare Population, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 285, 286-87
(1986); Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A Proposalfor Action, HEALTH AFFS., Summer
1984, at 6, 7; Wennberg & Gittelsohn, Small Area Variations in Health Care Delivery, 182 Sci. 1102
(1973).
20. See generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COUNCIL ON HEALTH CARE TECHNOLOGY, MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT DIRECTORY: A PILOT REFERENCE TO ORGANIZATIONS, ASSESSMENTS, AND
INFORMATION RESOURCES (1988); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ASSESSING MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES (1985);
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the total process by which society decides-formally and informally, publicly
and privately, well or poorly-on the appropriate uses of the various methods
available for diagnosing or treating disease. In its current vogue, however,
the notion of medical technology assessment contemplates specific public or
private programs featuring at least one of two elements: "knowledge
processing" (gathering, validating, interpreting, or disseminating existing
data and insights) and "knowledge development" (the generation of new data
and understanding through clinical trials, ethical and other assessments, and
other means).2 1 The discussion here focuses first on the demand side of the
market for formal assessments of medical technology, noting the increasing
interest in technology questions in the 1980's. It then examines the supply
side of that market, noting why there is an apparent shortage of such
assessments, observing the arrangements that are being made to meet the
unmet need, and finally arguing against letting the assessment of medical
technologies be monopolized by either public or private suppliers of
information. This background is essential to an appraisal of the effects on
competition of technology assessments by professional organizations.
A. The Demand for Medical Technology Assessment
The increased interest in medical technology assessment in the 1980's has
reflected concerns about both the quality and the cost of health care.
Although quality and cost considerations sometimes point in opposite
directions, better answers to many specific technology questions could have
positive implications for both patient outcome and the cost of treatment. The
growing enthusiasm for technology assessment is partly a response to this
win/win potential as well as to the shortcomings of traditional medical
institutions in screening for safety and efficacy. To a lesser extent, however, it
may also reflect the reversal of a long-standing neglect in the health care
industry of certain more controversial factors that should also influence
medical decisions.
Until recently, safety and efficacy were thought to be the only issues that
had to be resolved before a new technology could assume a place in the
medical armamentarium. Neither the financing system, which was generally
committed to pay for anything "medically necessary," nor medical ethics,
which essentially ruled out economic considerations in medical
decisionmaking, acknowledged the possible existence of tradeoffs between
quality and cost. Although quality and cost objectives are not always
inconsistent, there will be many situations in which a medical test or
procedure that is undeniably safe and efficacious-in the sense that the
probability of a net benefit to the patient's health is greater than .0-yields an
expected incremental benefit that may not be great enough to warrant
L. RUSSELL, TECHNOLOGY IN HOSPITALS 132-55 (1979); Foote, Assessing Medical Technology Assessment:
Past, Present, and Future, 65 MILBANK Q 59 (1987).
21. Foote, supra note 20, at 60 (citing Blumenthal, Federal Policy toward Health Care Technology: The
Case of the National Center, 61 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q 584, 589-592 (1983)).
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incurring its attendant cost.2 2 To be sure, such tradeoffs are frequently
ignored in the belief that overall costs can be significantly reduced without
compromising the quality of care. Nevertheless, quality/cost tradeoffs cannot
be finessed indefinitely, despite everyone's understandable reluctance to
place, even implicitly, a finite value on other persons' lives or health status. 23
Whether or not the new demand for medical technology assessments is
prompted in any measure by new interest in comparing marginal benefits with
marginal costs, better data would greatly facilitate such comparisons if and
when decisionmakers become prepared to face them.
Some of the new demand for medical technology assessment may reflect
fundamental changes in the health care industry that have lessened previous
tendencies to use costly technologies without good evidence of their worth.
For example, a series of developments, including antitrust enforcement, have
weakened the power of the organized medical profession to shape the delivery
and financing of medical care according to the ideology and economic
preferences of physicians. 2 4 Under earlier arrangements, the quality of care
was much honored by the profession as the sole desideratum in decisions on
medical matters. Quality assurance was expected to flow, however, from
paying individual practitioners on a fee-for-service basis and allowing them to
exercise independent judgment without cost constraints.2 5 Left to their own
devices in such a system, physicians were quite receptive to new technologies,
even without convincing evidence of their benefits to particular patients. 26
The most important impetus for the growth of high-tech medicine was
third party financing, which underwrote physicians' propensities to use
22. See generally Schwartz & Joskow, Medical Efficacy versus Economic Efficiency: A Conflict in Values,
299 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1462 (1978); Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-offs in
Medical Care: The Role of Professional Standards Review Organizations, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 6, 9-20 (1975).
23. See Schwartz &Joskow, supra note 22, at 1463; Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 22, at 9-
38.
24. See generally Havighurst, The Changing Locus of Decision Making in the Health Care Sector, I IJ.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 697 (1986).
25. To protect professional independence, the profession counselled against letting physicians
become accountable to any lay-controlled agency-especially one, it seemed, that might represent
the aggregate interests of consumers as purchasers. This professional attitude was embodied in an
ethical canon against "contract practice," which was found unlawful by the FTC in AMA v. FTC, 638
F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982). The legal system, not
appreciating all that was at stake, tended to ratify the doctors' belief that corporate middlemen were
inappropriate agents of the consumer by establishing a variety of prohibitions against the "corporate
practice of medicine." See, e.g., Wiorek, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An Outmoded Theory in
Need of Modification, 8 J. LEGAL MED. 465 (1987); Note, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An
Anachronism in the Modern Health Care Industry, 40 VAND. L. REV. 445 (1987).
26. See supra notes 17, 18. Despite their ostensibly scientific education, physicians were not fully
prepared to evaluate critically the scientific studies published in medical journals or the claims of
drug salesmen, nor were they adequately trained to distrust, on the ground of the smallness of the
sample, their own clinical experience or their colleagues' anecdotes. Instead, physicians were quite
ready to believe that anything they did, if sanctioned by published research and consistent with the
practices of others, was helpful to their patients. Many believed, moreover, that physicians were
motivated by a "technological imperative" that dictated doing something rather than nothing and
more rather than less. E.g., V. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE? 60, 95 (1974); Havighurst & Blumstein,
supra note 22, at 20-30 ("quality imperative"). The law of medical malpractice is widely thought to
reinforce this propensity to omit nothing that might in retrospect be deemed potentially beneficial.
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resources without regard to social costs. The medical profession itself
assiduously cultivated methods of financing care that expanded demand for
medical services (by making virtually everything affordable) while omitting
most of the controls that would be needed to offset the cost-increasing effects
of "moral hazard." 27 Although the profession supplied peer-review bodies to
resolve disputes about what should be paid for, the bias of professional peer
reviewers in favor of practitioner independence and against cost containment
left physicians with wide discretion. 2 8 In general, the old medical care
financing system lacked both reliable administrative checks on the adoption of
new technologies and incentives to discourage inefficient use of resources.2 9
In recent years and especially in the 1980's, public and private payers for
medical care have become increasingly concerned about costs and have finally
found ways to give effect to their concerns. In particular, they have moved
away from compensating providers in the ways that providers themselves
prefer. Thus, fee-for-service payments to professionals and retrospective cost
reimbursement to institutions are being replaced by various forms of
"prospective payment"-fixed allowances for treating a given condition, a
given patient, or a given population. These initiatives on the part of payers
have changed providers' incentives in ways that encourage some
economizing. At the same time, quality-of-care concerns, heightened by
rising malpractice claims as well as by fears that new incentives might prompt
overeconomizing, have appeared on the purchasers' side of the market in the
form of a desire to ensure that value is being received for money.
In general, the current market for health care services features somewhat
more skepticism than previously prevailed toward physicians' unconstrained
choices of treatment. Government programs have moved increasingly to
scrutinize and second-guess physician decisions in the interest of both
improved quality and cost containment. Similar skepticism has also begun to
appear in the private sector, where various consumer agents-individual
physicians, hospitals, HMO's, employers, insurers, and others-are tentatively
approaching the difficult task of weighing the benefits of particular medical
services against both the opportunity costs (alternatives forgone) and the
dollar costs thereof. The demand for more information useful in making the
necessary public and private judgments accounts for some of the new interest
in medical technology assessment.
27. This is the term used by economists for the natural tendency of people to suspend normal
economizing whenever they are in a position, because of insurance or otherwise, to risk or spend
another's funds. See P. JosKow, CONTROLLING HOSPITAL COSTS: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
REGULATION 21-31 (1981). On professional efforts to foster preferred methods of financing, see
Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978 DUKE L.J. 303; Goldberg
& Greenberg, The Effect of Physician-Controlled Health Insurance: U.S. v. Oregon State Medical Society, 2 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 48 (1977).
28. See generally Havighurst, Professional Peer Review and the Antitrust Laws, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1117 (1986); Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 22, at 25-68.
29. See generally Havighurst, The Questionable Cost-Containment Record of Commercial Health Insurers, in
HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 221 (H. Frech ed. 1988).
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B. The Supply of Technology Assessments
The recent increase in the demand for sophisticated technology
assessments seems not to have been met by a commensurate increase in the
supply of such assessments. 30 Part of the problem lies in a fundamental
failure in the market mechanism that might ordinarily be expected to call
forth supply to meet new demand. Despite the great social value of
information concerning medical technologies, severe free-rider problems
make it impossible to count upon private entrepreneurs to produce the
optimal quantity of such information. The shortfall in the private production
of medical technology assessments reflects the fact that information is a
"public good." 3'
Like other public goods, information is not consumed when it is used.
Unlike ordinary goods or services, which are purchased and used in varying
quantities, a buyer of information can make extensive use of it while paying
for it only once. He may also make it available to others, thus undercutting
the ability of its originator to recover its production costs by marketing it at a
price reflecting its value.3 2 Although copyright protection inhibiting copying
and other free riding might sometimes be obtainable, copyright infringements
are difficult to detect and police, especially if there are more than a handful of
users. In any event, a free rider might simply bide his time until he could
imitate the conduct of those who had access to proprietary information. 33
Ease of imitation, as well as ease of access, reduces the incentive for private
production. 3 4
Because public goods will be underproduced under market incentives,
special social arrangements are necessary if output is to approach the optimal
level. The special arrangements for producing information concerning
medical technology include all the institutions of medical science. Medical
research, both basic and clinical, is carried out for the most part by nonprofit
institutions and is largely financed by public and philanthropic funds.
Moreover, it relies upon the scientific tradition of treating research findings as
communal property; free sharing of information allows each researcher to
build upon the work of others and benefits anyone else to whom the
information is useful. Although medical research in such fields as
pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and genetic engineering is carried out for
30. There has, however, been a considerable outpouring of assessments. See generally INSTITUTE
OF MEDICINE, COUNCIL ON HEALTH CARE TECHNOLOGY, MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
DIRECTORY, supra note 20.
31. For a discussion of the distinction between private and public goods and the economic
problems connected with the latter, see R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAw AND ECONOMICS 108-12 (1988).
32. Similarly, a producer seeking to market information will find it difficult to practice profit-
maximizing price discrimination-that is, to charge buyers different prices based on the probable
value of the information to each. Not only could a buyer of information supply it to others while also
using it intensively himself, but arbitragers, posing as light or marginal users, could purchase the
information cheap and resell it to others.
33. For example, a health insurer might simply conform its coverage of new technologies to that
of larger, better informed payers, such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans.
34. See Havighurst, supra note 29, at 238-40.
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profit with patent protection available to frustrate would-be free riders, a
great deal of additional research, including the independent evaluation of
patented technologies, is of a nonproprietary character. Public and nonprofit
sponsorship of such research is a direct reflection not only of the difficulty of
effectively protecting and marketing intellectual property but of the social
inefficiency, once research findings (and any other public goods) are
produced, of excluding anyone from using them.
Because traditional medical research is heavily supported by public funds,
public policy makers have been increasingly able to direct the efforts of the
scientific establishment toward meeting the new demand for large-scale
clinical studies. The National Institutes of Health ("NIH") are leaders in this
effort to improve the quality of scientific evidence underlying decisions to
employ particular technologies. 35 Evaluations of important technologies have
also been undertaken or subsidized by such specialized government agencies
as the congressional Office of Technology Assessment 36 and the National
Center for Health Services Research and Health Care Technology
Assessment. 37 In addition to sponsoring definitive clinical studies, the federal
government also presides over efforts to collect and harmonize professional
opinion. Thus, the NIH convene so-called "consensus conferences" that
purport to declare authoritatively what is and is not accepted practice. 38
Some of the federal government's technology assessments have been
undertaken specifically to guide its own spending on health services. The
Medicare program, for example, must decide whether particular services are
efficacious enough to be viewed as "reasonable and necessary" when
prescribed for a Medicare beneficiary. 39 Such governmental assessments
provide data that may also be helpful to decisionmakers in the private sector.
Whether government's incentives and imperatives lead to the optimal amount
of investment in, or to pursuit of the right kinds of, technology assessment is a
matter for conjecture. 40
Although the public sector bears the primary responsibility for supplying
public goods such as medical technology assessments, private entities may
35. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ASSESSING MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 20, at 40-41, 58-
62.
36. See id. at 41-42, 424-36.
37. See id. at 43-44, 355-63.
38. See id. at 386-404; Perry, The NIH Consensus Development Program, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 485
(1987).
39. See generally NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HEALTH CARE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE
MEDICARE COVERAGE PROCESS (1988). The Medicare program must also determine which
technological developments warrant adjustments (upward or downward) in allowances to hospitals
under the so-called "prospective payment system"-under which Medicare pays hospitals a fixed
amount deemed sufficient to cover care for a typical patient with the particular patient's diagnosis.
See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MEDICARE'S PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM: STRATEGIES
FOR EVALUATING COST, QUALITY, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 113-27 (1985).
40. Even in the British National Health Service (where benefits and costs are internalized to a
greater degree than in U.S. financing), there are doubts whether the government assesses technology
as carefully or systematically as it should. See generally B. JENNETr, supra note 17; H. AARON & W.
SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION: RATIONING HOSPITAL CARE (1984); A. COCHRANE, supra note
17.
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also engage in activities that are useful in improving understanding and
increasing knowledge. Because of the difficulties of marketing public goods,
however, private technology assessment is more likely to be undertaken by
large organizations that can themselves internalize enough of the benefit to
justify the cost. There will also be a predictable tendency to concentrate, not
on conducting costly clinical trials, but on such cheaper and less reliable
activities as literature reviews and the sampling of expert opinion. The
national Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, for example, which
comprises plans that in the aggregate underwrite health care for a significant
percentage of the population, has had some incentive to undertake
cooperative information gathering. 4 1 Its efforts, however, have stopped short
of commissioning independent clinical trials of particular technologies.
Although all public and private payers for medical care have an interest in
obtaining information bearing on technology, most of them tend to follow the
herd, relying on the largest financers-especially the Blues and the Medicare
program-to collect, distill, and act rationally in accordance with the best
information available.
Much of the privately generated information concerning medical
technology emanates from professionals and professional organizations. For
example, the American College of Physicians, purporting to be concerned
about both quality and cost, has initiated an ambitious program to propose
practice protocols in internal medicine. 4 2 Other professional bodies, like the
AAO in the radial keratotomy cases, also appear to accept professional and
scientific responsibility to assist physicians and others in making sensible use
of new technologies. 43 The participation of professional organizations in
technology debates raises antitrust concerns prompted by the perception of a
possible conflict of interests. It also, however, offers the public access to a
valuable reservoir of knowledge and insight. As will appear below, the issue
that antitrust courts must resolve is whether professional sponsorship of
technology assessment perpetuates professional dominance, thus impeding
rather than promoting the movement toward a competitive market in which
choices are made, with good information, by consumers and independent
agents acting on their behalf.
Two alternative conclusions bearing on the antitrust status of a
professional organization engaged in technology assessment might flow from
observation of the variety of potential sources of technology-related
information. One view might be that professional organizations are not likely
to add enough new information to the available supply that society should
worry about losing their possibly biased input. On the other hand, the
availability of other sources of information might be thought to obviate the
danger that professional organizations can perpetrate serious abuses or
41. Two programs of the Blues are described in INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ASSESSING MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 20, at 309-27.
42. See id. at 275-85.
43. Id. at 54-55.
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continue to dominate decisionmaking. The legal analysis to come will lean
toward the latter view as being more in keeping with antitrust policy.
C. Monopoly Versus Pluralism
To some observers, medical technology assessment has a third element in
addition to the synthesis of existing information and the development of new
knowledge-namely, the incorporation of findings into official guidelines or
regulations that govern the implementation of the technology in question. 44
This view points toward a single, definitive assessment of each technology to
be undertaken under auspices that supposedly ensure objectivity and scientific
validity. The model that comes to mind is the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA"), which controls the marketing of prescription drugs
and medical devices.
The use of medical technology need not be governed by centralized
decisions, however. Logically, choices about whether and how various
technologies should be used could be left to the competitive market, which
comprises a multiplicity of decisionmakers, each accountable in some way to
consumers for the efficacy, quality, and cost of the care provided. In a
competitive market, technology assessments would be viewed, not as steps in
formulating governmental regulations or binding professional protocols, but
as efforts to facilitate better decisions at all levels, public and private. It would
be taken for granted under a decentralized, competitive regime that all
decisionmakers would not necessarily interpret the available data in the same
way, make the same tradeoffs, or heed the assessors' particular advice. A
corollary would be that technology assessments should emanate from diverse
sources and not be monopolized by a single authoritative agency, public or
private.
In fact, the regulation that already governs some medical technologies
stops well short of controlling their actual use in medical practice. Even
though the FDA makes clinical evidence of safety and efficacy a prerequisite to
the marketing of pharmaceutical products and medical devices, 45 it lacks the
power to control the use of technologies once they are approved; at the same
time, the FDA seeks to improve the quality of information available to medical
practitioners and their patients by regulating advertising and prescribing
labeling for approved products. 46 On the other hand, some regulatory
44. See Foote, supra note 20, at 60; Blumenthal, supra note 21.
45. The FDA's programs are summarized in INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ASSESSING MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 17, at 41-53.
46. On FDA regulation of advertising and labeling, see generally Fisherow, The Shape of Prescription
Drug Advertising.- Survey of Promotional Techniques and Regulatory Trends, 42 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 213
(1987). In 1980 the FDA adopted regulations requiring that certain prescriptions be accompanied by
package inserts developed specifically for patient use, 45 Fed. Reg. 60, 754 (1980), but these
regulations were subsequently retreated from, 47 Fed. Reg. 39, 249 (1982). See Kendellen, The Food
and Drug Administration Retreats from Patient Package Inserts for Prescription Drugs, 40 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 172 (1985).
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mechanisms affecting technology-specifically, state certificate-of-need laws47
and federally sponsored Peer Review Organizations 4 8-are expressly
designed to curb overutilization of services. They, too, leave medical
practitioners a great deal of clinical discretion, however. In general, the lack
of enthusiasm for a "cookbook" regulatory approach to medical care reflects a
sense that medicine is an art as well as a science and that patients vary not
only with respect to their medical conditions but also with respect to their
personal circumstances, needs, and preferences. Despite the general belief
that medical practice should reflect the latest scientific understanding, there is
little sentiment for trying to foster enlightened practice standards by
regulatory compulsion rather than by education.
Although technology assessment by professional organizations can be
viewed simply as a "procompetitive" input into a pluralistic process of
decentralized decisionmaking under competitive incentives, the vision of the
health care marketplace implicit in this conceptualization may not be realistic.
The discussion here considers whether failings of the marketplace-mostly as
a result of private decisionmakers' refusal to accept independent
responsibility for choices concerning the uses of medical technology-might
be deemed to warrant the use of antitrust law to take technology assessment
out of the hands of organized professional interests. This discussion should
help in the legal analysis to follow.
1. The Problem of Undue Reliance on Collective Judgments. The model of a
competitive market driven by the independent choices of consumers and their
agents, though seeming to legitimize professional organizations'
pronouncements on technological issues, is strikingly at odds with the medical
profession's traditional role in medical decisionmaking and with the
profession's own ideology and perception of itself. Although the tenets of
professional ideology are nowhere set down in official form, they can be
deduced from the medical profession's actual performance during the period
when it exercised de facto control over health care financing. Judging from
that experience, professional dogma appears to include such beliefs as the
following: that safety and efficacy are the only relevant considerations in
evaluating medical care; that decisions on utilization of health resources
should not turn on cost or the patient's ability or willingness to pay; that
decisions on the financing of medical practice are exclusively a professional
and scientific matter not amenable to consumer choice; and that health
insurance should cover without question all care that is within professional
47. State certificate-of-need laws attempt to control utilization of some costly technologies by
imposing gross limits on the supply thereof. See generally C. HAVIGHURST, DEREGULATING THE HEALTH
CARE INDUSTRY 53-74 (1982); Simpson, Full Circle: The Return of Certificate of Need Regulation of Health
Facilities to State Control, 19 IND. L. REV. 1025 (1986).
48. Although federally sponsored Peer Review Organizations have some occasions to police
overutilization of services, the professional norms they employ leave practitioners free to choose
within a fairly wide range. Cf Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 22, at 38-68.
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norms, excluding only that which is demonstrably harmful or wasteful.49
Given these decisionmaking criteria and ingrained perceptions of the relative
roles of professional and other decisionmakers, a professional organization
pronouncing its opinions on medical technologies is quite likely to believe
that its word should be received not merely as advice but as gospel. If the
effect of its pronouncements is to perpetuate a professional monopoly over
crucial choices concerning medical care, there would be a problem that might
concern an antitrust court.
A professional organization's claim of de facto authority to resolve
technology issues for society as a whole would be inconsequential if the
market's many independent decisionmakers were appropriately skeptical,
treated authoritative pronouncements as subject to bias, routinely employed
other sources of information in making their judgments, and took into
account values, such as cost considerations, that professional groups tend to
neglect. Unfortunately, it is not clear that those administering public or
private health care programs are prepared to take much independent
responsibility for hard choices concerning health care technology. Indeed,
payers often rely heavily, if not exclusively, upon professional organizations in
deciding what services to cover. In particular, some Blue Cross and Blue
Shield plans, perhaps as a carryover from their long-standing alliances with
provider interests, may approach technology assessment with essentially the
same philosophy as professional groups. 50 Under this philosophy, the object
of a technology assessment would be the development of a universal,
professionally validated payment policy rather than merely the provision of
better information for use by individual plans and their customers in custom-
designing coverage to suit particular needs and pocketbooks.
Although payers relying on professional consensus may simply be doing
the best they can in a world with inadequate information, their refusal to
exercise independent judgment perpetuates the old notion that the medical
profession should determine payment policies and denies consumers the
benefit of real competition. Of course, any collusive agreement by insurers
and others to avoid competition over crucial variables-by delegating
49. For a typical statement by an official of the American Medical Association, see Newton,
Henderson Man Battles System for Cancer Treatment, Life, Durham Morning Herald, Mar. 26, 1989, at AI,
col. 1, AI0, col. I (" 'As long as there is evidence that a drug is of value, it should be
reimbursable.' ") See generally Havighurst, supra note 24, at 700-08; Havighurst & King, Private
Credentialing of Health Care Personnel: An Antitrnst Perspective (pts. 1 & 2), 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 131, 263,
288-92 (1983)(discussing "ideology in medical care"); Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 22, at 25-
30, 41-45.
50. See Havighurst, supra note 29, at 248-54. Although competitive pressures have forced many
of the Blue plans to defect from their previous alliances and to come over to the consumer's side,
others may still make common cause with providers, using their market power to support rather than
to challenge provider cartels, which serve in turn to disadvantage the Blues' competitors. Id. In any
event, the same large aggregate market share that makes the Blue plans a promising private source of
technology assessments (despite the public-good character of such information) also implies a
possible risk that better information is being generated, not to facilitate decentralized decisions in a
competitive market, but to strengthen the dominant system and the perception that it is being
operated responsibly in consumers' interest.
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responsibility to professional bodies or otherwise-would be an antitrust
violation. 51 But universal acceptance of professional judgments on a
technology question might reflect only "conscious parallelism" resulting from
each payer's understandable fear of finding itself in a publicly exposed
position of denying payment-on sensitive benefit/cost grounds-for
physician-prescribed, arguably beneficial care that would be covered under
competing plans. 52 A market-oriented health policy would contemplate that
competing payers will design and enforce rational, efficient coverage for
various subsets of the consuming public. Unfortunately, the medical
profession's dominant decisionmaking role, 53 coupled with the legal 54 and
public relations 55 problems that "go-it-alone" cost-containment efforts are
certain to encounter, may make it unrealistic to expect competition to yield
pluralistic results anytime soon.56
Undue unanimity of attitudes toward medical technologies might also
result from a propensity of public and private decisionmakers to take their cue
unthinkingly from government. An instructive example involves the decision
by the FDA in 1983 to authorize the sale of cyclosporin, the
immunosuppressant drug that significantly increased the feasibility of liver,
heart, and heart/lung transplantation. 57 The FDA's action was viewed by
many payers as a sign that transplantation of these organs was no longer
"experimental" and should therefore be treated as a covered service despite
its extraordinary cost and its debatable benefit/cost ratio in many cases.
58
Though not universal, the widespread move to adopt this technology solely
on the strength of the FDA's approval is striking because the FDA focuses
only on the drug's safety and efficacy and does not even purport to weigh all
51. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 101-03. Cf Havighurst, supra note 28, at 1148-50.
52. On the evidence necessary to establish the collusion requisite for finding a Sherman Act
violation, see infra note 92.
53. The medical profession has never really conceded the legitimacy of decisions by lay-
controlled entities on medical matters. See supra notes 25, 49. Partly as a consequence, employers,
insurers, hospitals, and other potential agents of consumers have been slow to act without
professional sanction.
54. See Havighurst, supra note 29, at 240-42, discussing insurance regulation as a constraint on
various cost-containment measures that insurers might undertake. One legal risk that insurers face
in limiting their coverage of any treatment supported by medical consensus is tort liability for
denying payment in "bad faith." See C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 1204-12 (1988).
55. Some of the practical difficulties, stemming from public-good and free-rider problems, of
getting insured employment groups to accept cost-containment measures that are actually in their
economic interest are noted in Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma: Market Opportunities and
Legal Obstacles, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 143, 171 n.91.
56. For discussion of comparable tendencies of payers and others to follow professional
guidance on other, similar matters, see Havighurst, supra note 28, at 1148-51 (insurers' tendency to
be guided by professionally sponsored bodies engaged in evaluating fees, utilization, and quality of
care); Havighurst & King, supra note 49, at 155-57, 164, 166, 177-78, 193-94 (tendency of hospitals
and other institutions to respect professionally sponsored credentialing of health care personnel).
57. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HHS NEWS,
PUB. No. 83-19 (Sept. 2, 1983).
58. See Havighurst & King, Liver Transplantation in Massachusetts: Public Policymaking as Morality
Play, 19 IND. L. REV. 955, 965-66 (1986). Cf Newton, supra note 49, at A10, col. 1 (Blue Cross plan
official quoted with respect to Interleukin-2, a cancer drug: "Most carriers have to look to the
outside for direction on where coverage will enter. We seek the FDA approval.").
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the factors relevant to a rational decision to incur the costs of transplantation.
This experience is further evidence of the desire of many public and private
decisionmakers to avoid hard choices by relying upon any seemingly
authoritative decisionmaker who is available, even one who ignores relevant
considerations.
Although it is hard to judge both the current situation and the potential
for evolution toward de facto as well as de jure decentralization of
decisionmaking responsibility, it is possible that the marketplace is not
currently meeting the challenge of screening medical technologies on
benefit/cost grounds. This is not to concede, however, either that some other
mechanism is capable of performing the task better or that arguable
shortcomings of competition as an allocator of health care resources have any
bearing on antitrust analysis.
2. The Case for Pluralism. Private resistance to making hard choices
concerning medical technologies on a decentralized basis may easily be
interpreted as evidence of a societal desire for centralized decisions and as the
Achilles heel of a policy of seeking allocative efficiency through market
mechanisms. The desire for one big Technology Assessment leading to a
definitive public decision on the specific uses of each new medical product or
procedure is also reflected in common casual statements-often by those who
should in theory be assuming responsibility themselves-to the effect that
society as a whole must make difficult collective choices concerning medical
technology. 59 Instead of reflecting a desire for better information to guide
pluralistic decisions, the movement for better technology assessment may
reflect simply a desire for an authoritative final arbiter that is more reliable
and accountable than medicine's own institutions have proven to be.60
Although there is a legitimate policy question whether medical technology
assessment should be incorporated into a unitary command-and-control
system or should be viewed merely as an aid to decisionmaking in a pluralistic
marketplace, a court should consider itself bound to adopt the latter view by
the premises of the antitrust laws. The health care industry is, after all,
nominally competitive, lacking a statutory warrant for operating on a different
basis. Moreover, because market forces are not totally inoperative in health
care and are capable of taking firmer hold as cost and other pressures
intensify, it might be bad policy for the future development of the industry-
as well as bad law-for an antitrust court to view pronouncements by
professional groups on technology questions as suspicious acts. A joint
venture yielding a new product-especially consumer information that, as a
59. See, e.g., Havighurst & King, supra note 49; Newton, supra note 49 at AI0, col. 1.
60. It is not in fact clear that society has reexamined its earlier assumptions about the nature of
technology issues or fully accepted the appropriateness of decentralized decisionmaking on medical
matters. For the argument that economizing in the use of costly life-saving technologies will be
somewhat easier if decisions are increasingly made in the private sector on a decentralized basis, see
Havighurst, Blumstein & Bovbjerg, Strategies in Underwriting the Costs of Catastrophic Disease, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1976, at 122.
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public good, might otherwise be underproduced-would seem highly
procompetitive on its face. To be sure, technology assessment-like other
concerted informational activities, such as cooperative advertising and
competitor-sponsored accrediting, credentialing, and certification
programs6 1-may harm some competitors. Nevertheless, consumers would
probably suffer greater injury if antitrust courts, in an attempt to promote
fairness and objectivity, discouraged knowledgeable groups from
participating in technology debates.
The policy arguments for allowing wide participation in medical
technology assessment need not rest solely upon faith in competition as an
efficient allocator of health care resources. There are also good scientific
reasons for preferring a multiplicity of participants in any evaluation effort.
First, few studies of medical technologies yield definitive and final results.
Most raise questions to be answered by the next study, and parallel studies do
not necessarily duplicate each other but may instead yield deeper insights or
serendipitous findings. Second, because few investigators are immune from
mistakes or bias in designing an experiment or interpreting findings, scientists
often distrust experimental results until they are replicated in other studies.
Diversity in-that is, competition among-the sources of information
concerning medical technologies would seem socially advantageous without
regard to whether the ultimate decisions are to be monopolized by
government or left to the pluralistic marketplace.
62
III
ANTITRUST LIABILITY FOR EXPRESSING COLLECTIVE OPINIONS?
As long as a professional group confines itself to issuing opinions that bind
no one and publishing information for others to use, it might seem that its
actions could not possibly be characterized as being in restraint of trade.
After all, "trade"--that is, competition-is a process requiring nothing more
than a multiplicity of independent decisionmaking units whose interactions
and choices are conclusively presumed under the statutory policy to yield
socially desirable results. The publication of opinions and information
concerning the goods and services available in the marketplace does not
disrupt that process, nor does it directly alter the market's configuration or
diminish its competitiveness. Even if the behavior of market participants is
greatly influenced by what they hear and even if some competitors are
consequently hurt, the process is still intact. Indeed, it could be said to have
operated, with the information available, precisely as the law contemplates it
should.
61. See infra notes 68, 69 and accompanying text.
62. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ASSESSING MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 20, at 13 ("The
committee endorses this pluralism, believing that it contributes to the richness and variety of
assessment activities and serves as a system of checks and balances.").
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Although the Schachar case was ultimately dismissed under the foregoing
theory, 63 professional bodies that express opinions on technical matters
should probably still be prepared to face some antitrust scrutiny. Such
organizations are clearly "combinations" of competitors. And even if the
concerted action in which they are engaged does not directly restrain trade, it
has possible implications for the market's good performance. Not all courts
are as rigorous as Judge Easterbrook in identifying whether, or precisely how,
the competitive process has been disrupted in a particular case. Instead, they
often seem to use fairness and notions of equal opportunity as their criteria
for permissible concerted action and to rely upon subjective estimates of
consumer welfare as their measure of whether the market is working as it
should. 64
The radial keratotomy cases provide a good illustration of the issues here.
Even though the defendants' actions clearly hampered the plaintiffs in their
efforts to offer or obtain the new procedure, those actions might be viewed
only as serving the procompetitive purpose of advising interested persons on
an important technical issue, enabling them to make better-informed
purchasing decisions. Not only would Judge Easterbrook have no trouble
subscribing to this view, but even activist judges willing to regulate all
concerted action by standards of their own making might listen to policy
arguments for limiting their scrutiny of conduct that amounts to nothing more
than the expression of a collective opinion. As noted at the conclusion of this
section, plaintiffs in such cases will usually allege that the defendants did more
than just express an opinion. Nevertheless, clarification of the legal status of
mere speech should assist courts in handling cases of this kind.
A. Conflict of Interests as a Basis for Close Judicial Scrutiny
An antitrust court's reluctance to dismiss cases of this kind might rest
upon the perception that criticism of a new technology may not be inspired
solely by professional or scientific concerns or by a magnanimous desire to
produce a valuable public good. Objectivity may be distorted by an interest in
preventing practitioners of the new technology from competing effectively
with the dominant providers or by other interests. Some of the defendants in
the radial keratotomy cases, for example, although seemingly motivated by
true scientific doubts and a sense of their professional gatekeeping
responsibilities, may also have harbored anticompetitive objectives.
Alternatively, the defendants may simply have resented the large fees and the
presumptuousness of the entrepreneurial surgeons who pioneered the field
63. See supra text accompanying notes 10-15.
64. Boycott law provides examples. Instead of recognizing that competition is ipso facto
eliminated by any agreement in which competitors surrender their independent discretion and adopt
a common policy toward particular customers or suppliers, courts tend to focus on the unfairness of
the boycott and on the specific harm that consumers might suffer. See the fuller discussion, citing
cases, in Havighurst, Doctors and Hospitals: An Antitrust Perspective on Traditional Relationships, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 1071, at 1104-09.
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without waiting for academic medicine to approve.65 In any event, the
defendants were able to capture some of the radial keratotomy business for
themselves by obtaining federal funding for a clinical trial, under which their
own institutions became the most attractive providers of the procedure and
other institutions, without third-party payment, were placed at a competitive
disadvantage. 66 The fact that radial keratotomy was eventually determined to
be a moderately good technology67 may add credence to conflict-of-interests
allegations while also strengthening both the impression of unfairness and the
perception that consumer welfare was not well served.
Antitrust courts asked to regulate the collective publication of information
and opinion concerning medical technology may be prompted by the
apparent conflict of interests of the publishing organization to inqui, deeply
into the honesty of the opinions expressed and the accuracy of the
information conveyed. Although such skepticism is not misplaced, it does not
follow that close judicial scrutiny is the right response. The health care
industry is not unusual in the extent to which it relies upon self-interested
producers to supply vital information. Given the underproduction of
disinterested information concerning products and services of all kinds,
producers are frequently the consumer's main source of data helpful in
making purchases. 68 Commercial advertising, both by individual sellers and
by trade associations, is the most obvious example of information that is
useful to consumers despite its skepticism-inducing source. Another example
is the information supplied to consumers and others by competitor-sponsored
accrediting, credentialing, certification, and standard-setting programs.
Although such programs are sponsored by competitors and can severely
disadvantage other competitors, antitrust courts have usually viewed them
favorably-precisely because of the informational function they perform. 69
Profession-sponsored technology assessments, which may also involve
65. See 870 F.2d at 399:
Plaintiffs say that the Academy is in the grip of professors and practitioners who favor
conservative treatment, forever calling for more research (the better to justify the
academics' requests for grants); plaintiffs portray themselves as the progressives, disdaining
the Academy's fuddy-duddies in order to put the latest knowledge to work.
66. But see id. at 398-99 (noting that some plaintiffs still performed the procedure frequently and
that, in any event, had not alleged that they were actively prevented from doing so).
67. An opinion to this effect was issued as a result of the settlement in Vest v. Waring, 565 F.
Supp. 674 (N.D. Ga. 1983). See supra note 7. For a consumer group's view of the procedure, see
Goodbye Glasses?, CONSUMER REPORTS, Jan. 1988, at 52. Such assessments are unusual in the popular
press.
68. See generally Havighurst & King, supra note 49, at 152-55. The obvious exception is the
nonprofit Consumers Union with its authoritative Consumer Reports. See supra note 67.
69. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1931, 1937 (1988)
("private standards can have significant procompetitive advantages"); Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron
Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 486-89 (lst Cir. 1988) (upholding defendants' efforts to influence
product certifiers); Consolidated Metal Prods. v. American Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284, 296 (5th
Cir. 1988) ("Even if user reliance gives API significant influence over the market, that influence may
enhance, not reduce, competition and consumer welfare."). See also Havighurst & King, supra note
49, at 169-84.
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authoritative but debatable assertions concerning competitors' services, might
be regarded as similarly procompetitive. 70
Competitors' collective claims of superiority for their products or services
are also procompetitive in the less subtle sense that they are self-interested
efforts to compete on the merits. Although those who would justify
professional technology assessment as a service to the public are not inclined
to see the point, self-interest is no sin-nor even a suspicious circumstance-
in a competitive world where producers' pursuit of their own welfare is
presumed to advance the public interest. Thus, the suspicion that a
professional group may be less than wholeheartedly committed to serving the
public ought not to affect analysis in an antitrust case. Nor should the desire
of some professional groups to be judged as servants of the public interest
cause an antitrust court to view them other than as private groups entitled to
pursue their own interests in any way that is not inconsistent with the
maintenance of competition.
Further guidance on the proper scope of antitrust scrutiny of profession-
sponsored technology assessments may be gained by considering the limited,
but still substantial, protection accorded by the first amendment to so-called
"commercial speech"--that is, producers' representations about their own or
their competitors' products. 7' Public regulation of such speech is permitted
not only because of the commercial context but also because of the speakers'
powerful incentive to mislead. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has
said that commercial speech deserves some constitutional protection because
the information provided is valuable both to consumers individually and to
the market itself in allocating resources. 72 This acknowledgment of the
instrumental, market-strengthening character of free-speech rights suggests a
high degree of congruence between the constitutional policy of limiting
governmental intrusion into the marketplace of ideas and antitrust law's
pragmatic concern that the economic marketplace not be prevented from
working as intended. The analogy observed may suggest that antitrust law
should always lean, as does the Supreme Court in first amendment matters,
toward solutions that rely primarily on fostering additional sources of
70. The Schachar court relied directly on the cases cited supra note 69. 870 F.2d at 399.
71. See, e.g., In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) ("the states may not place an absolute
prohibition on [advertising] certain types of potentially misleading [commercial] information . . . if
the information also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive"); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (invalidating state restrictions
on advertising by pharmacists of prices of prescription drugs). On the definition of commercial
speech, see infra note 74.
72. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 (citations omitted), where the Court stated,
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our
resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It
is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well
informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.
Other first amendment cases placing primary reliance, not on the abstract rights of speakers, but on
the hearers' rights include Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301 (1965). See also infra note 73.
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information-that is, more competition in the marketplace of ideas-rather
than on suppressing speech or regulating its accuracy and content. 73
The commercial-speech doctrine takes explicit notice of the conflict of
interests of the parties seeking to influence consumer choices.7" Indeed, the
Supreme Court has given the strength of the speaker's economic interest as
one of its reasons for according commercial advertising less protection than
political speech, observing that this conflict of interests lessens the danger
that desirable speech will be chilled by regulation. 75 This point seems to cut
in the opposite direction for present purposes, however, because antitrust
regulation, with its treble-damage sanction and uncertain standards, is clearly
capable of stifling even the most self-interested speech; the chilling effect
would be even greater to the extent that the speakers were motivated by
professionalism and a commitment to scientific learning. Thus, whatever
other regulation might be appropriate to discourage false and deceptive
technology assessment, 76 limited scrutiny of commercial speech by antitrust
courts may be the furthest a court can go without violating either antitrust or
first amendment policy. Indeed, with a proper appreciation of antitrust's
preference for pluralism, it should not be necessary to invoke the Bill of
Rights at all. Antitrust doctrine should equally reflect the conclusion that an
apparent conflict of interests alone is not enough to trigger judicial scrutiny
that goes beyond establishing the facial legitimacy of a collective effort to
inform.
73. The Schachar court's discussion quoted infra in text accompanying note 81 is particularly
illuminating. Cf I/irginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769, where the Court rejected the
consumer-protection arguments for regulation suppressing price advertising because "on close
inspection it is seen that the State's protectiveness of its citizens rests in large measure on the
advantages of their being kept in ignorance," a policy strategy that the Court deemed the first
amendment to preclude. See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding
against a first amendment challenge the FCC's "fairness doctrine," a regulation curbing
broadcasters' editorial freedom but serving the greater constitutional interest in seeing that viewers
have access to a wider range of information and opinion.) But see Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (reaching different result for newspapers).
74. Indeed, the economic interest of the speaker in the message being conveyed would seem to
be a defining characteristic of commercial speech. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S.
60, 66-67 (1983). Another defining characteristic is reliance on a commercial market rather than a
political process as the forum from which "truth" is expected to emerge. Regulation of false and
deceptive advertising is permitted, of course, in recognition of the strong motive of the advertiser to
mislead and the state's police power to prevent commercial fraud. If the assumption of irremediable
ignorance and gullibility on the part of consumers was valid (as it often is), public control would be a
plausible response to a plausible ("clear and present") danger. In the case of technology
assessments, however, the decisionmakers to whom the information is primarily addressed are not
unsophisticated and would seem to have both the incentive and the capacity to collect relevant
information and to make consumer-oriented judgments on the basis thereof. The argument for
regulating this kind of (commercial) speech thus compares poorly with the arguments for regulating
deceptive advertising. Indeed, technology assessments by professional organizations might well be
deemed to fall outside the Supreme Court's narrow definition of "commercial speech," see id., and
thus to qualify for more protection against regulation than advertising receives.
75. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24 ("Since advertising is the sine qua non of
commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and forgone
entirely.").
76. For example, section 2 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1975), allows the Commission to
police "unfair or deceptive acts or practices."
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B. Should De Facto Influence Trigger Close Scrutiny?
The district judge in Schachar rejected the defendants' first amendment
arguments by stressing the AAO's prestige and apparent authoritativeness,
which were said to give its statements "significantly more weight and thus...
a more coercive effect than.., the views of individuals." 77 The court also saw
great significance-enough to deny the defendants summary judgment-in
the possibility that some third party payers, in refusing to pay for radial
keratotomy, "may have relied in whole or in part upon defendants'
statements." 78 Although the court thus appeared to hold that a prestigious
professional body must face antitrust liability whenever its debatable views on
some controversial issue are found persuasive by others, it is possible that it
meant no more than that such a body must be prepared to have its
informational activities scrutinized for anticompetitive abuse. Such a holding
would not purport to settle the question of the appropriate scope of judicial
review. Nevertheless, the court's denial of summary judgment on the basis of
the AAO's "coercive ... influence" 79 ensured that litigation would be costly
even if the court would ultimately defer to professionalism or hold the
plaintiffs to a high standard of proof. The district court was apparently not
concerned by the possibility that vigorous debate and the flow of information
and opinion would be chilled. It was certainly unprepared to accept the
simple argument, later adopted by the court of appeals, that the competitive
process, supplied with relevant information, had rendered a verdict that an
antitrust court should regard as incontestable.
The Schachar district court and some other observers would presumably
rationalize close judicial scrutiny of the informational activities of professional
organizations by observing that the market for medical services does not work
as the textbook model contemplates and, specifically, that some organizations
speak with so much authority that they cannot be regarded merely as
participants in an open debate. To be sure, as noted earlier, physician
organizations have long been recognized as quasi-public authorities whose
views are expected not merely to influence but to govern the actions not only
of their own members but of other independent actors as well. The issue is
thus nicely posed: Assuming that the world does still rely unduly upon
professional pronouncements concerning medical technologies, is that
reliance an excuse for antitrust courts to police closely the actions of
influential professional bodies by providing vigilant judicial review of their
pronouncements and awarding treble damages whenever they are found to
abuse their de facto authority as technical advisors to professionals and the
general public?80 The court of appeals in Schachar answered this question as
follows:
77. 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,986, at 58,052.
78. Id. at 58,052 n.4. But see supra note 66.
79. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
80. Strong support for a negative response is provided by Consolidated Metal Prods. v.
American Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284, 296 (5th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted):
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An organization's towering reputation does not reduce its freedom to speak out.
Speech informed, hence affected, demand for radial keratotomy, but the plaintiffs had
no entitlement to consumers' favor. The Academy's declaration affected only the
demand side of the market, and then only by appealing to consumers' (and third-party
payors') better judgment. If such statements should be false or misleading or
incomplete or just plain mistaken, the remedy is not antitrust litigation but more
speech-the marketplace of ideas. 8 '
To subject a professional body to close judicial review solely on the basis
of the influence it wields might be seen as penalizing its success in
establishing its credibility and earning the confidence of independent
decisionmakers. Putting aside, however, the arguable perversity of punishing
such commercial success, there are other grounds for not regulating this kind
of commercial speech. Antitrust courts are poorly equipped to evaluate the
quality and honesty of opinions and information generated by professional
organizations. By hypothesis, the issues are highly technical and
controversial. Litigation closely examining the merits of these issues, the
circumstances and effects of various pronouncements, the motives of the
parties, the honesty of the opinions expressed, and the accuracy and
completeness of the facts reported would always be protracted and costly. Yet
it would usually be inconclusive on the central questions.8 2 Even if judges
and juries were ultimately deferential to professionals in their final rulings,
Although there is some danger that API could use its influence to reduce competition, this
danger is small so long as users rely voluntarily upon the API monogram. If users choose
freely to rely on API approval, API has influence principally because it has done a good job
evaluating products. If API fails to evaluate products accurately, consumers free to sample
nonmonogrammed goods will gradually discover the monogram's diminished usefulness
and cease relying upon it. Thus, the greatest threat to competition is in the short run,
before a significant number of buyers shop around. Even this threat is mitigated to the
extent that producers of unmonogrammed equipment have alternative means of reassuring
consumers of the quality of their products. They may, for example, offer warranties,
commission product tests by someone other than API, provide free (or low-cost ) samples of
their product, and advertise.
The court of appeals upheld summary judgment for the defendants, essentially taking a "quick look"
to satisfy itself on the procompetitiveness of the product certification system. In American Soc'y of
Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1116 (1982), the Court held a
standard-setting body liable for abuses of its processes by agents acting in its name but actually on
behalf of a particular producer seeking to exclude a competitor's product. This holding is quite
consistent with a policy of giving only limited scrutiny-a "quick look" under the rule of reason-to
competitors' collective efforts to persuade and inform potential users of their products.
For an interesting nonantitrust opinion suggesting that the scope ofjudicial review of actions of
an educational accrediting body should be calibrated according to the influence exercised, see
Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc.,
432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1970), ceri. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970). For a critique of such a sliding-scale
approach, see Havighurst & King, supra note 49, at 164-66, 191-94.
81. 870 F.2d at 399-400. The court also made clear that it was not the limited impact of the
"experimental" label but the lack of any direct restraint of trade that undermined the plaintiff's case.
82. It is legitimate to develop antitrust rules to avoid inquiries that, while theoretically indicated,
are likely to serve no useful purpose. Thus, courts have felt free to condemn certain practices under
per se rules despite the possibility that deeper inquiry would discover redeeming procompetitive
virtues. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982); Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (noting the appropriateness of conclusive presumptions-
per se rules-that avoid "the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic
investigation . . .- an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken"). There is less acceptance
of the idea that similarly conclusive presumptions of legality might also sometimes be justified on the
same basis. However, the argument for doing so, in order to avoid stifling conduct that is nearly
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
the high cost of trying such cases might result in many costly settlements even
when the defendants had great confidence in their ability to prevail. The
potential for such costly and unpredictable lawsuits would ultimately deter
physician groups from sponsoring technology assessment, leaving the task
almost entirely to the public sector, which might not provide complete or
timely guidance for decisionmakers and, depending upon how its assessments
were done, might stifle diversity even more than professional bodies.
The alternative risk is that close judicial oversight would contribute to
fulfilling the very prophecy and perpetuating the very market dysfunction that
together provide the courts' rationale for intervening. Judicial review might
simply confirm the defendant organization's status as a quasi-public body,
thereby enhancing the credibility and influence of its pronouncements. Thus,
if a professional body were willing to incur the cost of defending and even
possibly losing an occasional lawsuit, it might achieve the very stature and
authority it most covets. 83 It might then be able to control developments
more effectively than it could if courts took the opposite tack of treating
professional bodies only as possibly biased participants in an open
marketplace of ideas in which credibility is not ensured by judicial verification
but must be earned by good performance. In the long run, professional
authority is more likely to find its proper level under the skeptical eyes of
market participants than under judicial supervision.
Faith that independent decisionmakers will be appropriately skeptical
toward professional organizations may seem misplaced given their
pusillanimity to date. The reasons why various decisionmakers have been
reluctant to depart from professional consensus on matters relating to
medical technology are difficult to identify. Some constraints are legal.84
Other explanations include the difficulty of capturing cost savings and
avoiding free riders, fear of professional retaliation or criticism, the difficulty
of educating consumers to their true economic interests, and the complex
always procompetitive and efficiency-enhancing, is powerful. See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell
Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983) (citations omitted):
[U]nlike economics, law is an administrative system the effects of which depend upon the
content of rules and precedents only as they are applied by judges and juries in courts and
by lawyers advising their clients. Rules that seek to embody every economic complexity and
qualification may well, through the vagaries of administration, prove counter-productive,
undercutting the very economic ends they seek to serve. Thus, despite the theoretical
possibility of finding instances in which horizontal price fixing, or vertical price fixing, are
economically justified, the courts have held them unlawful per se, concluding that the
administrative virtues of simplicity outweigh the occasional "economic" loss. Conversely,
we must be concerned lest a rule or precedent that authorizes a search for a particular type
of undesirable pricing behavior end up by discouraging legitimate price competition.
By analogy, antitrust scrutiny of informational practices should not be allowed to stifle the output of
information and opinion.
83. Although only a few of the many actions that a professional body might take would expose it
to antitrust suits, the prestige conferred upon the organization by courts reviewing those few
activities-in the same manner that they review actions of public administrative agencies-would
carry over to all its actions. For a comparable argument for limiting scrutiny of competitor-
sponsored accrediting and credentialing actions, see Havighurst & King, supra note 49, at 193-94.
84. See supra note 54.
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politics of employee health benefits.8 5 Although some of these constraints are
being overcome as the private sector tries to resist rising health care costs, it
may be a long time before decisions that are in the interest of consumers but
contrary to medical consensus become routine. Even so, the needed
demystification of the medical profession is not likely to result from closer
oversight of professional organizations by antitrust courts. On the contrary,
the best hope for competition would still appear to lie in opening up the
marketplace of ideas, encouraging all interested persons to participate, and
relying upon robust debate and criticism, an awakening private sector, and
public sponsorship of technology assessment to bring us nearer to elusive
scientific truths and informed consumer choices concerning medical
technology. If the assumption that consumers will ultimately look out for
their own interests proves wrong, legislatures can act either to dispense with
independent decisionmaking or to improve the climate for it.
C. Deciding These Cases
The foregoing analysis suggests that antitrust courts should subject
professional organizations to no more than limited scrutiny when they publish
influential information and opinion concerning controversial medical
technologies. Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Schachar can be read as going
even further, precluding antitrust scrutiny altogether unless the defendants
took additional steps to harm competition. 86 Informational activities by
competitor groups might sometimes be influential enough, however, to
warrant scrutiny under a rationale similar to that underlying the so-called
"essential facilities doctrine" of antitrust law, which applies when one group
of competitors, with the potential for exercising market power, controls a
resource to which other competitors must have access if they are to survive at
all. 87 Nevertheless, application of the rule of reason to detect adverse effects
85. See generally Havighurst, supra note 29, at 231-54 (exploration of causes of health insurers'
reluctance to take independent action on health care costs).
86. The court found it decisive that the Academy had not "prevented [any plaintiff] from doing
what he wished or imposed sanctions on those who facilitated the work"-e.g., by referring patients,
paying for the procedure, or providing facilities. 870 F.2d at 399. But see infra note 87.
87. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 13 (1945) (dominant news-pooling
association of newspapers); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 397 (1912) (joint
railroad control of sole river crossing); United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1355
(5th Cir. 1980) (multiple listing service); Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194
F.2d 484, 486-89 (1st Cir. 1952) (joint control of favorably located warehouse), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
817 (1952). On competitor collaboration in research and development joint ventures, see
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE CONCERNING RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES 21-24 (Nov.
1980) (indicating that a dominant venture, if lawful at all, would not be allowed to exclude
competitors arbitrarily). For a fuller discussion of the essential-facilities doctrine in connection with
physician control of the award of hospital staff privileges, see Havighurst, supra note 64, at 1 111-25.
For another application of these principles to competitor-sponsored informational activities, see
Havighurst & King, supra note 49, at 176-84.
Despite the holding reported supra note 86, the Schachar court left room for this theory of antitrust
liability by observing that an antitrust cause of action might lie if "one group of suppliers diminishes
another's ability to peddle its wares (technically, reduces rivals' elasticity of supply)," 870 F.2d at
399, and by noting the trial court's "puzzling refusal to define a product market even though the first
question in any rule of reason case is market power," id. at 398. Market power is a necessary element
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on competition under this theory need not involve more than a "quick look"' 8
by which the court can satisfy itself that the defendants lacked market power
or that the information or opinion tendered had a rational basis. No more
extensive scrutiny should be undertaken, because there is no less restrictive
way to accomplish the procompetitive informational purpose 9 and, as argued
above, the activity is more procompetitive than anticompetitive. Not being
facially inconsistent with the maintenance of competition as a process,
collective speech should not have to be justified affirmatively on the ground
either that it is disinterested or that its informational content actually
advances consumer welfare. 90
Even if courts generally agreed to limit their scrutiny of collective
expressions of opinion and assertions of fact, these cases might still be
complicated by plaintiffs' predictable allegations that the defendants did not
confine themselves to publishing opinions and information but also engaged
in more conventional restraints of trade. Both horizontal and vertical
restraints might be alleged. The discussion here suggests how such
allegations can be handled without deterring useful collaboration.
1. Direct Horizontal Restraints? Horizontal agreements that eliminate
competition between the parties themselves are the Sherman Act's primary
concern and are conceptually distinct from agreements by competitors merely
to formulate and advocate a partictilar view on some technical matter. 9'
Nevertheless, even though an association's members may not explicitly agree
in an essential facilities case because antitrust law should be invoked only if the joint venturers would
be able to influence price, output, or competitive behavior if the rivals victimized by their practices
left the market.
88. See 7 P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1511 (1986) (discussing how the dichotomy between per
se offenses and other cases is breaking down as courts learn to apply the rule of reason
expeditiously-sometimes "in the twinkling of an eye"--thus obviating extensive inquiry where the
court can quickly ascertain whether the elements of an offense are present).
89. On the less-restrictive-alternative requirement, see infra note 95.
90. See supra note 80.
Even though society might be legitimately concerned about false or deceptive assessments of
medical technology, that concern alone does not bring the collective publication of information and
opinion within range of the Sherman Act, which is appropriately concerned with "unfair
competition" only when it threatens to create undue market power. For example, the offense of
attempted monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. 1988), is usually
thought to require proof of a "dangerous probability" that the defendant will succeed in creating a
true monopoly. See, e.g., Handler & Steuer, Attempts to Monopolize and No-Fault Monopolization, 129 U.
PA. L. REV. 125, 128-29 (1980).
Although other legal weapons might be employed to curb informational abuses that do not
qualify as antitrust violations, an antitrust court should be unwilling to determine, at the behest of
competitors, the truthfulness and the completeness of the statements made. A policy requiring these
issues to be litigated in such a court would restrain more trade than it would protect. Despite this
logic, some courts will still no doubt sense a mandate to ensure fairness in the competitive struggle
and will use the Sherman Act as their warrant for policing falsity and deceptiveness. Even so, the
standard for identifying abuses should recognize that the competitive process is not impaired, and
indeed is rendered more dynamic, by spirited debate. Thus, it should leave ample room for
judgment in the interpretation of evidence and for differences of opinion on important matters,
looking only far enough to discern whether there is a rational basis for the pronouncements made.
91. The Schachar court was especially clear on this point. See supra text accompanying notes II -
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to abide by the group's announced view, a plaintiff might allege a tacit
conspiracy to eschew using the questioned technology or to boycott those
who do use it. A high degree of uniformity in the members' response to the
new technology-conscious parallelism-would make the conspiracy charge a
challenging one. Unfortunately, the distinction between a lawful agreement
merely to express a collective opinion and an unlawful agreement to tailor
competitive conduct in accordance with that opinion is much clearer in theory
than the factual distinction between such agreements is likely to be in a
particular case.
Antitrust courts generally require substantially more than conscious
parallelism to establish a horizontal conspiracy. 92 Not only must so-called
"plus factors" also be established, 93 but courts have been hesitant to infer a
conspiracy even when such circumstantial evidence is presented. 94 Indeed, it
is ironic that antitrust courts may be quicker to scrutinize collaborative
statements for signs of what they regard as an anticompetitive motive (that is,
a desire to win the competitive race) than they are to view those same
pronouncements as signals for truly anticompetitive collusion. In any event,
any threat by the professional group to enforce its view against its own
members-perhaps in the form of an ethical proscription or an implicit threat
of expulsion from membership-would open the group to antitrust attack.
Likewise, any hint of a concerted refusal by the members to deal with, or to
refer patients to, practitioners of the questioned technology would also be
challengeable on the theory that the competitors had surrendered their
responsibility for making independent judgments under competitive
pressures and constraints.
Even though a horizontal conspiracy is difficult to establish by proof of
conscious parallelism and plus factors, the potential for costly litigation exists.
Thus, a professional organization would be well advised to lay what
groundwork it can for getting potential charges of conspiracy dismissed
quickly. Thus, it should disavow in its opinions any intention to dictate its
members' conduct and should demonstrate real tolerance for diverse
behavior and opinions within its membership with respect to the technology
in question. Because professional organizations can rather readily avoid
conduct that is truly conducive to collusion while still performing their
informative functions, the threat of antitrust litigation based on horizontal
collusion should not deter truly procompetitive activities. One need have no
special sympathy for a professional body that gets enmeshed in protracted,
92. See Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954).
Parallel conduct attributable to oligopolistic interdependence may be unlawful, however, even if an
actual agreement to refrain from competitive behavior cannot be inferred. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
United States, 306 U.S. 208, 222-23 (1939) (dictum). An inference of actual or tacit collusion is
generally recognized as permissible where the parallel conduct would be contrary to the self-interest
of each individual competitor unless all competitors acted in the same manner. See Ambook Enters.
v. Time, Inc., 612 F.2d 604, 614 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 914 (1980); Bogosian v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 445-47 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
93. See generally Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, and Antitrust Law, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 439 (1982).
94. See P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 288-315 (1988).
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costly litigation because it failed to take steps to dispel any belief among its
members that they were expected to share, and conform their conduct to, the
majority's views. Because of the danger that concerted action will follow
when a professional organization declares itself on certain matters, courts are
entitled to insist-under the "less-restrictive-alternative" requirement of the
rule of reason 9 5-that collective speech take a form that minimizes the threat
of such anticompetitive effects.
A conceivable issue of horizontal restraint might also arise if two or more
professional organizations should agree to adopt and propagate a common
view of a particular technology. Although there is no precedent for an
antitrust attack on a naked conspiracy to eliminate competition in the
formulation and expression of gratuitous opinions on commercially
significant matters, the legal theory supporting such an attack would not be
quite as far-fetched as one might expect.96 Admittedly, as public goods, the
opinions offered are not typical articles of trade or commerce, to which the
Sherman Act exclusively applies. Nevertheless, they are produced at some
cost and have real commercial value to consumers and their agents. Most
importantly, if the marketplace is to have access to a variety of views, it is
essential that such opinions be produced under competitive rather than
monopolistic conditions. Thus, if there were a shortage of other information
and opinion and no efficiency justification for an agreement to speak with one
voice (instead of independently), an antitrust court would probably advance
consumer welfare by penalizing concerted action of this kind. Nevertheless,
legal doubts and problems of proof-including the difficulty of showing in a
specific case that two cooperating organizations had not arrived at their views
independently and simply combined for efficiency reasons-probably
eliminate any prospect for antitrust suits of this kind. Earlier discussion has
shown, however, that, where feasible, remedies preserving or restoring
competition in the production of information and opinions are preferable to
regulation of the content of commercially significant speech.97
2. Vertical Restraints? Allegations of vertical restraints are also likely to
complicate cases of this kind.98 Plaintiffs can be expected to contend that the
95. Where a joint venture of competitors would be valid because it contributes to efficiency, but
the venturers possess power that poses a real danger to the maintenance of vigorous competition in
the market as whole, "reasonableness" requires that the venturers achieve their legitimate purposes
in ways that do not pose unnecessary hazards to competition. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock
Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (holding that a lawful self-regulatory body was required under the
antitrust laws to employ fair procedures to reduce the risk of anticompetitive abuse); United States v.
Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1369-87 (5th Cir. 1980) (reviewing joint venture's
membership requirements to ensure that they served legitimate needs and were no more restrictive
than reasonably necessary to accomplish lawful purposes); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Corp., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (ancillary restraints permissible only if
reasonably necessary to achieve their legitimate object).
96. Cf Havighurst & King, supra note 49, at 295-300, 311-25. See infra note 124.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62 and 68-76.
98. The Schachar case did not involve such allegations, however. 870 F.2d at 398 ("Plaintiffs
concede that the Academy did not attempt to coordinate activities with these groups, actors
independent of the Academy.").
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defendants did not rely solely upon the persuasiveness of their
representations but actually enlisted third party payers, hospitals, or others in
a conspiracy depriving the plaintiffs of a fair opportunity to compete. A
typical case would be colored by meetings and correspondence between the
organized opponents of a new technology and health insurers or hospital
medical staffs, following which the latter may have adopted largely uniform
policies disadvantageous to those dealing in the questioned services. Courts
faced with such allegations and facts must sort out the situation so that truly
independent decisions by the entities solicited are identified and recognized
for what they are-precisely the force that makes markets work, not suspicious
circumstances requiring justification.
Unless a party standing in a vertical (noncompetitive) relationship to the
contending practitioners can be shown to have acted against its own
competitive self-interest in adopting the view being urged, any allegation of
vertical conspiracy should fail:
To survive a motion for summaryjudgment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking
damages for a violation of § 1 must present evidence "that tends to exclude the
possibility" that the alleged conspirators acted independently. [Plaintiffs], in other
words, must show that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the
competing inferences of independent action .... 99
In one case, an organization of psychiatrists persuaded a physician-controlled
Blue Shield plan to discriminate against the psychiatrists' competitors, clinical
psychologists. The court rejected the allegation of a vertical conspiracy,
however, stating that "it was not illegal for [the psychiatrist group] . . . to
make recommendations aimed at persuading Blue Shield to adopt its proposal
and use [its members'] services, absent some form of coercion."' 0 0 Any other
result in cases of this kind would interfere with legitimate efforts to compete
by attempting to persuade relevant decisionmakers of the relative merits of
the services being offered.
More serious allegations of vertical restraint would focus on the possibility
that a professional group brokered a horizontal conspiracy against the
plaintiffs among their customers or suppliers-or, in these cases, among
third-party payers. As noted earlier, a herd instinct may exist among health
insurers, who are anxious to be told how to regard a particular technology
and to be relieved of the competitive responsibility to make independent
judgments or to put the difficult choice to their customers, such as employers
and employment groups. There may therefore be some risk that a
professional organization could orchestrate a common response to a new
99. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986), quoting
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984). See also Business Electronics
Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988). It seems probable under these holdings
that an insurer could refute an inference of conspiracy based upon its compliance with the
professional organization's recommendation by showing potential cost savings that provided an
independent motive for its action.
100. Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624 F.2d 476, 483 (4th Cir.
1980).
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technology by carrying messages back and forth among decisionmakers,' 0 '
playing upon their reluctance to take an independent position and their
eagerness to act as their competitors do. 10 2
A professional organization wishing to avoid exposure to a charge of
aiding, abetting, and participating in collusion among insurers or others with
respect to a new technology could protect itself by exercising care in the
manner in which it urges its position. Perhaps the wisest course would be to
avoid dealing directly with insurer trade associations. It should also make
certain that it does not become a channel of communication among
competitors seeking to conform their conduct to that of others. Once again,
by inducing collaborators to adopt "less restrictive alternatives,"'' 0 3 antitrust
law can reduce real threats to competition without chilling activities that are
truly procompetitive.
IV
ANTITRUST ISSUES IN CLINICAL TRIALS
A professional organization that organizes a clinical trial of an emerging or
existing technology might contribute important new scientific learning but
interfere substantially with competition in so doing. Indeed, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to organize and design a scientifically valid trial
without significantly infringing upon both the competitive freedom of the
participating physicians and consumer sovereignty. Consider, for example,
the efforts that might be necessary to induce a sufficient number of physicians
to participate. Believing that the evidence did not yet warrant routinely
prescribing a new procedure or other technology, the organization might
declare it unethical for a practitioner to employ it except in the context of the
trial. Although such an edict would be helpful in getting physicians to take
part, the underlying agreement by the members to limit their competitive
independence would clearly restrain trade, thus raising the question whether
such restraints are excusable because they are ancillary to a joint venture to
create new knowledge.
101. See supra note 92. For a leading case in which communication through an intermediary
supported an inference of conspiracy, see Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208
(1939).
102. The radial keratotomy cases disclosed the existence of a formal program whereby the
Council of Medical Specialty Societies, of which the AAO was member, routinely advised the Health
Insurance Association of America (HIAA) of the status of new technologies. When radial keratotomy
was declared experimental by the AAO, it was listed in an HIAA newsletter under the heading
"Procedures Which Should Not be Reimbursed Routinely by Third Party Payers Without Written
Justification." Schachar, 1988-1 Trade Cas. at 58,051. The HIAA was not a defendant in the cases,
however, even though its activities facilitated a uniform response by payers to the AAO's
recommendation. Nevertheless, the strongest evidence against the professional defendants,
including the AAO, appeared to be their assistance to the HIAA in organizing a true insurer boycott
of radial keratotomy. See supra text accompanying notes 51-56. Neither the complaints nor the
courts' opinions, however, characterized the AAO's conduct in these terms.
103. See supra note 95.
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The rules governing the conduct of the trial itself are also likely to impair
the process of decentralized decisionmaking. Although patients are free not
to participate in the trial (their "informed consent" is necessary 0 4), there may
be no other way for them to obtain the new treatment from a reputable
practitioner, in a good hospital, or at a third party's expense. Moreover,
participation in the trial is no guarantee that the patient will get access to the
procedure, because a proper trial requires a control group, whose experience
will be compared with outcomes using the new technology. In general, the
scientists' need to ensure randomness in the choice of treatment, blindness or
double-blindness concerning the patient's actual status in the trial, and the
statistical significance of the cumulative results makes it certain that consumer
choice will be systematically denied, with sometimes troubling results.10 5
Indeed, it would be hard to visualize a more complete stifling of competitive
independence and consumer choice than occurs in a well-designed clinical
trial. 0 6 An antitrust court would be hard pressed, under antitrust doctrine, to
avoid condemning what may well be a sincere and socially useful effort to
improve understanding of an important subject.
One of the peculiarities of antitrust law is that courts and commentators
persist in formulating the legal test for evaluating concerted action under
section 1 of the Sherman Act as being whether trade is "unreasonably"
restrained, even though the statute clearly states that "every" restraint is
prohibited. As every student of antitrust law knows, the early courts grappled
with this problem of statutory construction and resolved it by adopting the
rule of reason.' 0 7 Every serious student also knows that the rule of reason
does not allow trade to be restrained whenever it is deemed reasonable as a
policy matter to set competition aside-that is, whenever the defendants can
demonstrate that they were motivated by a socially worthy purpose. 08
Instead, the rule of reason means only that the court should not jump to the
conclusion that every agreement restricting competition between
independent entities is necessarily prohibited. Reason should be exercised to
determine whether the particular concerted action is compatible with the
maintenance of competition as society's chosen mechanism for allocating
resources. Competitor collaboration should therefore be judged to restrain
104. See generally J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 523-724 (1972).
105. For example, even though evidence might begin to accumulate against a particular method
of treatment, the study should not be stopped until there is enough data to give statistical validity to
the study's ultimate results; some patients will therefore still be treated with the apparently inferior
technology until the scientists declare the trial over. On the ethics of this dilemma, see Freedman,
Equipoise and the Ethics of Clinical Research, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 141, 141-42 (1987) (citing other
discussions).
106. Although the infringements on provider and patient freedom inherent in clinical trials may
be viewed (as here) in antitrust terms, they are ordinarily addressed as ethical problems. See, e.g., C.
FRIED, MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION: PERSONAL INTEGRITY AND SOCIAL POLICY 29-36 (1974);
Freedman, supra note 105 (arguing that a physician should suppress his ethical qualms about
participating in a trial in the presence of uncertainty in the medical community).
107. See infra note 122.
108. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978). See also infra note
115.
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trade only if it reduces the vigor of competition in some market to such an
extent that, despite the collaboration's arguable benefits to competition and
to consumer welfare, consumers would be worse off if it were allowed. The
Supreme Court has formulated the test for reasonableness as being "whether
the challenged agreement is one that promotes or one that suppresses
competition." '0 9
The problem examined here is made especially difficult by the failure of
commentators, lawyers, and courts to view the collective production of
information and informed opinion as they would view a joint venture to
produce material goods or services that could not be produced at all, or
produced as efficiently, in the absence of competitor collaboration.
Concerted action to produce a public good should, it would seem, qualify
presumptively as a highly procompetitive undertaking. Nevertheless, because
a verdict of procompetitiveness would rest upon the presumed benefits of the
information to competition in a market separate from the market for
information itself-that for the technology in question-the analysis cannot
stop simply with the observation that a new and presumably valuable product
is being produced. Instead, there must be some balancing of benefits to
competition against potential harms to it.
Potential harm to competition is in part a function of the market power
that the collaborators might wield if they should choose to abuse their
position. A professional organization representing the majority of the
practitioners in a specialty field would seem to have such power.
Nevertheless, it would be relevant to consider whether there is a fringe group
of competitors-nonmembers or mavericks within the organization-who
might provide the questioned service to those patients who, after being fully
informed, really wanted it and were fearful of participating in the trial.
Possession by the collaborators of any appreciable market power should,
however, trigger a further inquiry into whether the joint venture had been
designed to eliminate no more competition than was necessary to achieve its
procompetitive object. Indeed, real help in resolving the problem at hand
may be found in the rule of reason's requirement that collaborators who are
in a position to harm the competitive process must achieve their legitimate
purposes by adopting a "less restrictive alternative" ("LRA") if one is
reasonably available.' 1 Thus, if the procompetitive purpose being pursued
truly requires a particular restriction of the parties' competitive freedom, the
restriction should not be condemned without balancing the projected benefits
of the collaboration to the competitive process and consumer welfare against
the harm to consumers that might be expected to ensue from the restrictions
themselves. Application of this test to profession-sponsored clinical trials
should lead a court to examine the scientific merits of the study's design and
the social importance of the problem being studied. Under such an analysis, a
109. Id.
110. See supra note 95.
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well-designed study aimed at eliciting important, efficiency-enhancing
information might well be permitted to proceed.
A good clinical study requires large numbers of participating patients, thus
suggesting that efforts to enlist practitioners serve a procompetitive purpose.
Under the LRA requirement, coercion would not be an appropriate way to
enlist participation, but an opinion as to the importance of the trial that was
couched in ethical terms might not seem out of order if it was accompanied by
a disavowal of any intent to impose sanctions.1 1 ' The rules for conducting the
trial itself should be examined to see whether they are more restrictive than
necessary to accomplish the alleged scientific purpose. By invoking the LRA
requirement, an antitrust court might reinforce the legal and ethical
requirement of informed consent, thus protecting the opportunity of
consumer/patients to seek additional information and exercise choice.
Although the recommended analysis might cause an antitrust court to
tolerate a network of quite severe restraints of trade, the LRA requirement
would also impose a strict limit on the duration of the trial, thus ensuring that
the professional group could not rig the market for an indefinite period.
Once the information sought in the trial was obtained, the market would have
to be allowed to return to its natural competitive state, thus mitigating the
adverse effects of the restraints. Imposing a strict, scientifically determined
time limit on the trial would ensure that its benefits are realized without more
restraint of competitive forces than is truly necessary. Of course, if a
professional group sought to establish a trial of indefinite duration ostensibly
to examine long-term effects of the technology, the court would probably
have to conclude that the harm to competition was too great and too long-
lasting in comparison with the benefits to be derived. Such trials could be
carried out under other auspices or using other methods. It is often possible,
for example, by relying on so-called natural experiments, to mount long-term
studies without the rigorous restraints of a randomized trial. The law would
appear to give consumers the benefit of competition while such studies are
being conducted.
One question that has arisen in the radial keratotomy cases is whether
government's participation in the design and financing of the trial confers any
antitrust immunity upon the private proponents. Because Congress has not
given its express blessing to anticompetitive arrangements of this kind if they
are entered into under the oversight of government officials, the answer to
this question is clearly that the antitrust laws continue to apply to
government-financed or -sponsored studies by professional groups.'i" 2 The
analysis offered here, however, would, if adopted, leave significant room for
such studies because it visualizes that good scientific design, which
111. Of course, practitioners might be gun-shy about the possible liability risks they incur in not
following standards of dominant medical groups. The legal system should therefore leave room for
practitioners to depart from the dominant standard of care if they make adequate disclosure. See
generally Havighurst, supra note 55.
112. This was the holding in Vest v. Waring, 565 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
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government funding agencies presumably foster and to some extent
guarantee, would be a good defense to an antitrust charge.
V
CONCLUSION
Antitrust law has been increasingly recognized in recent years as an undue
constraint on collaboration among competitors, sometimes sacrificing
efficiency and reducing consumer welfare. This article has offered legal,
economic, and other reasons why antitrust courts should leave organizations
of professional competitors free within a wide range to participate in debates
concerning medical technologies. In addition to resolving questions
surrounding a specific instance of competitor collaboration in the production
and dissemination of scientific information and opinion, the article may also
be read to throw some useful light on several general analytical issues
regularly encountered in administering the antitrust laws. These concluding
remarks attempt to draw some broader lessons from the foregoing analysis.
A. Professionalism as an Antitrust Defense
A question frequently encountered since active enforcement of the
Sherman Act began in the medical care field in the mid-1970's is whether
professional status might entitle defendants to special leniency before an
antitrust court. Although the Supreme Court has held out in several cases the
possibility that professionals, although not exempt from the antitrust laws,
might be subject to softer antitrust rules than other tradesmen, it has yet to
rule in favor of professionals on such a basis in any case.' 3 Medical
technology assessment, however, might seem to be an appropriate occasion
for explicitly recognizing the ethical concerns and public responsibilities that
professionals are supposed to possess by relaxing the antitrust rules
applicable to their collective activities. After all, physicians engaged in
technology assessment are not acting to reduce competition among
themselves. They are instead-on the face of it, at least-attempting to
protect the public against untested medical procedures that overzealous or
113. Each of the Court's successive statements of its reservations about applying the antitrust
laws to professionals has been narrower than the preceding one. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon
State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17
(1975); National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978); Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348-49 (1982). In its most recent pronouncement,
the Court, although acknowledging that "we have been slow to condemn rules adopted by
professional associations as unreasonable per se," also said that application of the rule of reason to a
concerted refusal by dentists to provide x-rays for their patients' dental insurers to use in cost
containment was "not a matter of any great difficulty." FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S.
477, 458 (1986). The Court specifically rejected the excuse that the dentists were motivated by
professional concerns about the quality of care their patients would receive under the insurers'
restrictions. In light of these precedents, it is no longer easy to argue that professionals qua
professionals are entitled to especially lenient treatment under the antitrust laws. On the other hand,
markets for professional services are unusual in some respects (see Professional Engineers, 421 U.S. at
696); thus, application of the rule of reason to protect both efficiency and competition in such
markets may require special intellectual effort.
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unethical physicians might induce ignorant consumers to purchase.
Perceiving this to be precisely the kind of consumer protection that society
has long expected the medical profession to provide, many would approve an
antitrust court that treated such activities with special deference-either as a
legitimate exercise of professional prerogative' "4 or as a legitimate response
to a recognized imperfection (consumer ignorance) in the market for
professional services. ' 5
The antitrust defense of medical technology assessment in this article-
like that in the Schachar case, the only legal authority directly on point-does
not depend at all upon the professionalism or allegedly noncommercial
motives of the physician organizations engaged therein. Adhering to the well-
established but frequently neglected view that a worthy social purpose cannot
redeem a restraint of trade, 1 16 this article argues that the collective activities
surveyed can be justified on other grounds-specifically, their
procompetitiveness and fundamental consistency with the competitive
process. Thus, this article demonstrates that standard antitrust doctrine is
quite capable of reaching a sensible result without carving out a special
exception for an elite class of defendants." 7
114. In Wilk v. AMA, 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984), a court of
appeals recognized a peculiar kind of limited professionalism defense for a naked physician
conspiracy to boycott chiropractors. Any professional prerogative to take otherwise prohibited
collective action in patients' interests was rather clearly negated, however, by the Supreme Court's
opinion in Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 477 (1986).
115. Because courts have never held that all naked restraints-that is, all restraints whose object
contemplates reducing the general vigor or narrowing the scope of competition-are illegal per se,
some principled doctrinal basis on which some such restraints can be upheld must be identified.
Courts have tended only to speak vaguely of "reasonableness," "noncommercial purpose," or the
necessity for specific "anticompetitive intent"-formulations that fly in the face of the statute, which
is concerned only with effects on competition. In theory, however, a restraint intended and designed
only to overcome the effects of consumer ignorance (a particular problem with professional services)
or some other certifiable (and serious) market failure could be viewed, without incoherence, as a
procompetitive undertaking not out of keeping with the competitive paradigm upon which antitrust
policy is founded. Thus, a sincere effort by competitors to make an imperfect market yield results
closer to those of an efficient market might be tolerated precisely because it would not constitute, on
its face, "a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act." National Soc'y ofProf Eng'rs, 435
U.S. at 695.
Obviously, a court should be highly skeptical of any competitor group's claim that its only object
is to strengthen competition and benefit consumers. Indeed, the implausibility of such claims and
the rarity of cases in which they would be accepted might seem to justify ignoring the possibility of
redemption and declaring all naked restraints unlawful. Cf supra note 82. There is a good pragmatic
reason, however, why antitrust law should keep narrow defenses of this kind available in theory even
if they are rarely recognized in practice: Antitrust policy would be less credible politically if it
appeared to embody an ideology that was impervious to the fact that competition does not always
work in accordance with textbook theories or in the overall public interest. Thus, if antitrust
enforcers refused even to listen to such arguments (on the ground that the statute requires
competition for better or for worse), affected groups, especially influential professional ones, might
find it much easier to appeal to legislatures for antitrust exemptions and other relief from alleged
persecution by hidebound free-marketeers. See Havighurst & King, supra note 49, at 296-98, 280
n.51.
116. See supra text accompanying note 108.
117. The court of appeals in Schachar did not even allude to possible defenses based on the
defendants' professional status. Its statement that the status of radial keratotomy "is a medical
rather than a legal question," was offered not to suggest a special prerogative but in response to the
plaintiffs' claim that a professional organization has a special "obligation to the public." 870 F.2d at
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It would be a distinct service to the integrity of antitrust doctrine if courts
would likewise eschew analyzing the collective actions of physicians as a
special category of restraints and concentrate on developing all-purpose tools
for distinguishing between anticompetitive and procompetitive collaboration.
If it seems necessary to bend established principles in order to reach a
procompetitive, efficiency-enhancing result in an antitrust case, then those
principles should be reexamined and reshaped so that they serve the statutory
objective of enhancing consumer welfare. If, on the other hand, the reason
being urged for departing from standard doctrine is simply a felt need to
exempt doctors from the rules of free enterprise in order to realize an
allegedly greater good, then the courts, which lack statutory authority to
engage in such policy making, should refuse to go along. Explicitly treating
professionals as no less likely than the rest of us to combine to pursue
economic self-interest would not only force courts to increase the rigor of
their antitrust analysis but also complete what is proving to be a healthy
procompetitive revolution in American health care.
B. Protecting Competition, Not Competitors
A professional group's expression of an influential opinion concerning a
particular medical technology presents another problem commonly
encountered in antitrust analysis-namely, that of distinguishing
collaboration that jeopardizes consumer welfare, as served by the
maintenance of competitive markets, from joint conduct that affects adversely
only the welfare of certain competitors.' 18 A danger in the administration of
the antitrust laws is that sympathy for a disadvantaged competitor or distrust
of powerful defendants may lead judges to equate loss of a competitor with
harm to competition. They may thus view their function as being to referee
the competitive contest, enforcing some standard of fairness against those
who are perceived to be in a position unfairly to dominate the market-or, in
the case of technology assessment, to prejudice it against certain goods or
services. Such refereeing could easily convert antitrust law from being an
instrument for maintaining healthy competitive conditions in the interest of
consumers into a tool for policing unfair competition primarily in the interest
of competitors.
400. For a series of articles arguing that other professional activities can likewise be analyzed
sensibly under the antitrust laws without reference to the professional status of the defendants, see
Havighurst, supra note 28; Havighurst, supra note 64; Havighurst & King, supra note 49; Havighurst,
supra note 27. (The latter two articles develop theses-principally the argument that professional
groups that engage only in the production of information should be subject to no more than a "quick
look" under the rule of reason-that are similar to the ones in this article.) Use by antitrust courts of
artificial distinctions and exceptions as narrow grounds for saving certain types of legitimate
concerted action can be doctrinally destructive, especially where, as here, that decisional strategy
seems to confirm that general antitrust principles would otherwise condemn efficiency-enhancing
collaboration.
118. It is frequently stated that antitrust law is intended to protect "competition, not
competitors." E.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977), citing
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
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Antitrust law should serve functional, efficiency-enhancing purposes and
not just provide opportunities for indulging regulatory impulses or for
cathartic bashing of the rich and powerful. Past attempts to shape antitrust
doctrine to advance policy goals other than the maintenance of competitive
conditions have contributed to incoherence, inconsistency, and
unpredictability in the law, raising litigation risks and costs, discouraging the
singleminded pursuit of efficiency, and protecting the inefficient."i 9 The
Sherman Act should thus be read to embody the presumption that consumers
are better served in the long run by a rough-and-tumble competitive struggle
than by judicial regulation of competitive behavior. Antitrust relief should
therefore be denied to competitors whose true complaint is simply about the
rigors of competing in a hotly contested market.
Reduced to these essentials, the issues examined in this article resemble
those underlying the ongoing ideological struggle for the soul of antitrust law.
In that struggle, adherents of the so-called Chicago School, reading the law as
embodying a consumer-oriented policy with efficiency as the exclusive
criterion, 2 0 vie with those who view antitrust law as also incorporating a
concern for fairness and populistic political values, even at some cost to the
consumer.' 2 ' Although Judge Easterbrook's Chicago-style opinion in
Schachar will be persuasive to many, the battle to discourage judges from
regulating competitive behavior and reversing the sometimes harsh
119. This is essentially the charge leveled by the Chicago critics. See infra note 120. See also
Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law: The Statutory Approach to Antitrust, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1163, 1167-70, 1191-
1213 (1988).
120. See generally R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 81-89 (1978);
R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8-22 (1976); Posner, The Chicago School of
Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979). Judge Easterbrook's expositions of the Chicago
thesis are cited supra in note 14. The Supreme Court appeared to move in the direction of the
Chicago position in Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Rejecting concern about
dealer independence as a basis for challenging a vertical restraint, the Court said, "[ciompetitive
economies have social and political as well as economic advantages, . . . but an antitrust policy
divorced from market considerations would lack any objective benchmarks." Id. at 53 n.21.
121. A good recent overview of the policy debate, citing and summarizing numerous authorities
(including such critics of the Chicago school as Professors Fox, Hovenkamp, and Kaplow), appears in
Arthur, supra note 119, at 1201-13. Professor Arthur argues that the warring camps adopt an
erroneous "constitutional" view of antitrust, under which the statutes are interpreted simply as a
delegation by Congress of policymaking responsibilities to the courts. The policy debate is thus
fated to go on indefinitely and inconclusively, says Professor Arthur, as judges and scholars give
range to their divergent political philosophies, balancing the competing values differently and
producing incoherent law. Professor Arthur argues convincingly that the public interest in making
antitrust law predictable would be better served by an alternative "statutory approach," which would
focus exclusively on whether the defendants have interfered with the competitive process.
Although the present article follows the usual Chicago School approach in arguing that economic
efficiency and the broad public interest are truly served by competitor collaboration in the provision
of information, it essentially employs the statutory approach in its bottom-line conclusions.
Similarly, Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Schachar appears also to turn less on policy than on a strict
construction of the statute, thus possibly avoiding Professor Arthur's strictures. In general,
Professor Arthur's campaign to return antitrust law to a search for the specific meaning of statutes
seems a helpful prescription. On the construction of section 1 of the Sherman Act, compare the
four-step methodology in Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 263, 334-47 (1986), with C. HAVIGHURST, supra note 54, at 325-30 (note on the rule of
reason).
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judgments of the marketplace is far from over. The case of profession-
sponsored technology assessment may nevertheless serve to illustrate the
foolishness of trying to referee the competitive contest and the wisdom of
letting the competitive process play itself out, without appeal.
C. Identifying and Analyzing "Ancillary" Restraints
Yet another familiar problem of antitrust analysis would be presented by a
professional group's conduct of a rigorous clinical trial of a new or existing
technology. The court's task in such a case is to determine whether the
restraints imposed on the competitive independence of the physicians
participating in the trial and the limitations necessarily imposed on consumer
sovereignty were justified by the larger objective of eliciting valuable
information. Courts have frequently encountered difficulty in knowing when
obvious and substantial restrictions should be condemned as per se violations
of the antitrust laws-that is, without regard to their specific effects or the
particular circumstances. The alternative approach is to judge the specific
restrictions in light of their actual or probable net effect on competition and
consumer welfare. The problem of distinguishing so-called "ancillary"
restraints from "naked" ones, which ordinarily cannot be redeemed by any
justification, has existed since the earliest days of antitrust enforcement. 22
Nevertheless, courts still struggle with it.123
A clinical trial organized by a physician organization would present the
issue here in a particularly stark form because the restraints involved would be
numerous and of the severe sort that usually qualify for per se treatment.
Nevertheless, there is no reason why even severe restraints imposed by a
powerful professional group cannot be justified under the ancillarity principle
if all the conditions-especially the less-restrictive-alternative requirement-
are met. As argued earlier, the features that might redeem a clinical trial are,
first, its procompetitive informational objective, which must be borne out in
both the competitors' overall conduct and the trial's design, and, second, its
limited duration, which could make even very severe restraints tolerable in
122. E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60-68 (1911); United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), af'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
123. Perhaps the Supreme Court's worst effort in this field was United States v. Topco Assocs.,
405 U.S. 596 (1972) (condemning under per se rule a horizontal market-division arrangement clearly
necessary to effectuate a procompetitive joint venture). For a wiser opinion on a similarly
procompetitive arrangement, see Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.). A series of opinions written for the Court by Justice Stevens further
illustrates the difficulties: National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)
(clarifying that a naked restraint cannot be redeemed by demonstrating that competition was
infringed for a worthy social purpose); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332
(1982) (stating that the Court was bound to apply a per se rule by its own prior precedent, but
actually taking a "quick look" under the rule of reason to establish that the arrangement was not
likely to be procompetitive in fact); NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (ostensibly
eschewing application of a per se rule, but then proceeding only to demonstrate that the restraint
was naked and lacked any procompetitive virtue and therefore warranted condemnation without
proof of market power-that is, per se treatment). Only the most careful reading of the latter two
opinions, ignoring what Justice Stevens said he was doing and focusing on what he actually did,
makes them sensible applications of the rule of reason.
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light of the benefits soon to be derived. If antitrust courts, laboring under
misguided precedent, cannot bring themselves to excuse incidental restraints
that serve a larger procompetitive purpose, legislative relief might be in
order. Given the difficulty of getting Congress to write an appropriately
limited exemption, however, one should hope that the problem can be
obviated by judicial adjustments of received doctrine.
D. Antitrust Law and Information
A final general issue addressed in this article is the antitrust significance of
information produced and disseminated by organized competitors. Legal
appraisals of efforts by influential competitor groups to compete by
informational means must reflect a sophisticated understanding of the
competitive process and how it can be impaired not only by competitors
conspiring to exclude their rivals but also by antitrust courts engaged in
overregulation. This article has demonstrated the importance of information
and opinion in the operation of the market for health services and has called
attention to the workings of the market for information itself. Because
information is a public good that tends to be underproduced by disinterested
private producers, the consuming public is dependent for vital information
upon competitors' representations. Although the impulse to use the antitrust
laws to regulate the quality and content of the information thus produced may
sometimes be very strong, antitrust law provides only a very limited warrant, if
any at all, for judicial intervention.
Economic markets may also be marketplaces of ideas and information-
vital forums in which scientific and technical theories compete, empirical data
are adduced, and decisions are made and remade on the basis of accumulating
evidence. The medical context examined in this article provides an excellent
opportunity to recognize the kinship between the dynamic competitive
process that the antitrust laws are designed to protect and the marketplace of
ideas protected by the first amendment. Antitrust law, this article has argued,
should be enforced with a view to maintaining the robustness of the entire
competitive process, including competition in the realm of scientific opinion
and information. Information is power. More information from more
sources-that is, competition in the scientific and ideological marketplace-is
liberating and provides the best answer to those who would propagate
untruths or half truths. If antitrust law is to be applied at all to the market for
information and opinion, it should be used, not to regulate what may be
produced, but to prevent actual or potential competitors in that market from
combining or conspiring to restrict the output of data or the diversity of views
expressed. 124
124. See supra text accompanying notes 96, 97. For an unconventional proposal to focus antitrust
law on protecting competition in a unique "relevant market"-that for information and opinion
concerning commercial goods and services -see part two of Havighurst & King, supra note 49, which
seeks to demonstrate:
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the unlawfulness of certain hitherto unquestioned relationships among independent entities
actually or potentially engaged in producing valuable consumer information. The key to the
analysis-and the shortest and surest path to sensible legal results-is recognition that a
market for commercially valuable information and opinion exists and can be kept
competitive by applying traditional antitrust principles to those participating in it. Aside
from the straightforward observation that consumer information is itself a product that
should be produced under competitive conditions and whose output is subject to
destructive trade restraints amenable to scrutiny under the Sherman Act, the analysis does
not depart from the antitrust mainstream.
Id. at 334.
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